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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

delegate to the Corps under the Commerce Clause, the Court held the
Corps did have jurisdiction over waters with a sufficient hydrological
connection to navigable waters.
Thus, the Corps' jurisdiction could therefore reach any branch of
a tributary system that eventually flowed into a navigable body of water
or a water of the United States, and any wetland adjacent thereto.
Since the Newdunn wetlands were adjacent to the nonnavigable ditch
that drained into the navigable waters of Stony Run, the last question
was whether the ditch constituted a tributary of Stony Run. Noting
that rerouting the ditch did not meaningfully alter the wetlands'
longstanding connection to Stony Run, and that the Corps' definition
of "tributary" included roadside ditches, the court rejected Newdunn's
asserted distinction between natural and man-made watercourses for
purposes of defining "tributary."
Therefore, the Newdunn wetland was adjacent to a tributary of a
navigable water, and was subject to the Corps' jurisdiction for the
purpose of CWA permitting requirements.
Owen Walker

FIFFH CIRCUIT
In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Oil
Pollution Act did not permit federal government to impose
regulations over tributaries that were neither themselves navigable nor
truly adjacent to navigable waters; bayou containing residue from oil
spill flowed directly into company canal that was navigable-in-fact and
was plainly adjacent to navigable waters, thus triggering federal
regulatoryjurisdiction pursuant to Oil Protection Act).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
Coast Guard (collectively "United States") filed suit against James and
Janell Needham ("Needhams") for reimbursement of cleanup costs
associated with an oil spill. The United States Bankruptcy Court
("bankruptcy court") for the Western District of Louisiana found that
the Needhams were not liable to the United States for the cleanup
costs because the waters in question were not navigable, and were
therefore beyond the reach of the Oil and Pollution Act ("OPA").
After the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana affirmed, the United States appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which reversed
and remanded the lower court decisions.
On January 25, 1995, an employee of Needham Resources, Inc.
("NRI"), owned by the Needhams, pumped oil into a drainage ditch.
Initially, NRI hired a private contractor to clean the spill, but lacked
the financial resources to complete the effort. The United States
finished the cleanup effort, expending $207,000. On February 8,
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1998, the Needhams filed for bankruptcy in the bankruptcy court.
The Needhams objected to EPA's proof of claim arguing they were not
responsible for the costs since the spill did not implicate any navigable
waters subject to federal jurisdiction, and therefore was not subject to
OPA regulation. The United States claimed that the incident was
subject to OPA regulation because the oil spilled into waters adjacent
to an open body of navigable water. Both parties agreed that the oil,
originally discharged into the drainage ditch, spilled into Bayou
Cutoff, and then into Bayou Folse. Bayou Folse flows directly into the
Company Canal, an industrial waterway that eventually flows into the
Gulf of Mexico. The bankruptcy court found neither the drainage
ditch nor Bayou Cutoff navigable-in-fact, nor were they sufficiently
adjacent to the navigable waters to support OPA jurisdiction, and thus
concluded the spill was not subject to federal regulation. The district
court affirmed, finding no basis to disturb the bankruptcy court's
conclusions. The United States then appealed the district court
decision.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower courts' findings
that the waterways were not navigable-in-fact for clear error. The court
first analyzed the language of the OPA. The OPA imposes strict
liability upon parties that discharge oil into navigable waters, a term
defined in the statute to mean the waters of the United States. Under
the OPA, each party responsible for a facility from which oil is
discharged into navigable waters or upon adjoining shorelines is liable
for the removal costs and damages resulting from such incident. The
OPA permits recovery of cleanup costs if oil spills into navigable-in-fact
waters or into non-navigable waters that are truly adjacent to an open
body of navigable water. The United States argued that "navigable
waters" covers all waters having any hydrological connection with
navigable water. The court held the OPA was not so broad as to
permit the federal government to impose regulations over "tributaries"
that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable
waters. The court further stated a body of water is subject to
regulation if the body of water is actually navigable or adjacent to an
open body of navigable water.
Applying this interpretation of the OPA, the Fifth Circuit held the
lower courts' findings constituted clear error. Specifically, the court
held it was clear error to disregard the effects of the spill on Bayou
Folse and the Company Canal-the proper inquiry was whether Bayou
Folse, the site of the farthest traverse of the spill, was navigable-in-fact
or adjacent to an open body of navigable water. The court then
concluded that Bayou Folse was adjacent to Company Canal, an open
body of navigable water.
Next, the court examined whether Bayou Folse was adjacent to the
Company Canal. The court stated that the term "adjacent" implicates
a "significant nexus" between the water in question and the navigablein-fact waterway. Applying this standard, the court held Bayou Folse
was plainly adjacent to the Company Canal, as Bayou Folse flowed
directly into the canal. On this basis, the court held the oil spill
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implicated navigable waters and triggered federal regulatory
jurisdiction pursuant to the OPA. Thus, the court overruled the lower
courts' findings and remanded for consideration of the Needham's
remaining defenses.
Dave M. Shohet

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Le-Ax Water Dist. v. City of Athens, 346 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding rural water district could not use federal law-intended to
protect rural water associations from local governments taking away
customers-to require new customers outside of district's stateestablished geographic boundaries to use the district's services).
A judicial order created the Le-Ax Water District ("Le-Ax") as a
rural water district in 1980 after Le-Ax filed of a petition in the Athens
County Court of Common Pleas. The order specifically defined LeAx's geographical territory. University Estates owned 825 acres located
in close proximity to, but not within the geographic boundaries of, LeAx and the City of Athens, Ohio ("Athens"). For nearly twenty years,
Le-Ax maintained an eight-inch water main adjacent to the University
Estates property. After deciding to develop the property into a golf
course community, University Estates contracted with Athens instead
of Le-Ax for water service. Le-Ax then filed suit against Athens in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking
to prevent Athens from supplying water to University Estates. Le-Ax
argued the agreement for Athens to supply water to University Estates
violated 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). After both parties moved for summary
judgment, the district court denied Athens's motion and granted
summary judgment in favor of Le-Ax. Athens appealed the summary
judgment rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first concluded that Congress enacted
section 1926(b) ("statute") as part of the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act to protect certain federal loans made to water service
associations by preventing competition with the recipients of the loans.
The statute prohibits local governments from expanding their water
service into a rural water district's territory. To use the statute to
prevent Athens from providing water services to University Estates, LeAx had to prove it: (1) constituted an association as provided by the
statute, (2) carried the federal loans defined in the statute, and (3)
provided or made services available to the area in dispute. The court
held undisputed evidence showed Le-Ax qualified as an association
with the proper federal loans under the statute. Additionally, the
court determined Le-Ax provided or made service available to the area
in dispute after Le-Ax showed it had the physical ability to provide the

